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In this paper, an integrated cash flow model is developed to examine the relative impact 
of tax incentives, financial subsidies, and macroeconomic variables on the profitability of 
industrial investments. It allows for various variables to interact with each other. An 
application of the model is carried out for Taiwan, which implemented a variety of fiscal 
incentives over the past forty years. The principal policy conclusion is that trade and 
macroeconomic policies are much more important than income tax incentives or subsidized 
finance policies in determining the success of industrialization process. The effects of any of 
the fiscal incentives are found generally much smaller than those of the trade policies or the 
fundamental trends in macroeconomic variables such as the movement of the real exchange 
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The question of whether fiscal incentives can have a significant impact on industrial 
investment and economic growth has been the subject of considerable debate.
1 The fiscal 
incentive policies in countries that have experienced rapid industrialization usually have not 
been implemented in isolation, but rather as part of a concerted effort by governments 
including infrastructure and technical support to industries. Equally important in affecting 
industrialization may be the macroeconomic environment including the movement of the real 
exchange rate and real wages. Determining which variables have a relatively greater impact on 
the demand for investment is an interesting, but difficult task. Even with the help of an 
econometric analysis or a computable general equilibrium model, we would still have serious 
difficulties in measuring, in a reliable way, the specific response of firms to the components of 
fiscal incentive packages and economic variables. 
  
Taiwan has been often considered as one of the models of economic growth for 
developing countries. Since 1955, tax incentives have been popular policy instruments for 
influencing the allocation of investment.
2 The main purpose of this paper is to develop a set of 
integrated cash flow models of industrial investments that allow us to evaluate the relative 
                                                           
*The authors are indebted to Arnold Harberger, An-Loh Lin, and Dwight Perkins for their comments and 
suggestions. Responsibilities for any errors are solely the authors’ and any opinions expressed herein are those of 
the authors alone. 
1 See, e.g., T. Viherkentta, Tax Incentives in Developing Countries and International Taxation, (Finland: Finnish 
Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1991); A. Shah, ed., Fiscal Incentives for Investment and Innovation, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995).  
2 The total revenue cost of tax incentives accounted for approximately 5 to 9 percent of the total tax collections.  
Income tax incentives for business were the most common. The next in importance was the business commodity 
tax credit. The business commodity tax incentives initially increased more rapidly than that of income tax 
incentives. Their importance, however, declined and finally vanished when the government introduced a European 
style value-added tax system in April 1986. This is because that, once VAT was introduced, tax credits for input 
taxes paid represent an intrinsic feature of the VAT system and could no longer be regarded as tax incentives for 
export promotion. 3 
impact of fiscal incentives and selected macroeconomic variables on the profitability of 
investments over a forty-year period.  
 
Section II reviews the main fiscal incentives implemented in Taiwan, followed the 
movement of key macroeconomic variables. Section III presents the model necessary to 
estimate the impact of fiscal incentives and other economic variables. Section IV describes the 
data sources, and presents the empirical results obtained through the model’s simulation. 
Section V calculates the increase in factor productivity required for sustainable economic 
growth, and concluding remarks are made in the last section.   
 
II.  Tax Incentives and Macroeconomic Variables  
 
Over the past forty-years, 1955-95, Taiwan has transformed its economy.
3 During the 
period, the government of Taiwan implemented a variety of fiscal incentives, along with the 
movements of key macroeconomic variables. The relative importance of these factors on its 
industrialization is assessed in this paper. 
  
2.1  Business Tax Incentives 
 
The development of the Taiwan’s economy can be classified into five strategic stages in 
which many fiscal incentive measures were launched. With the exception of the last phase, 
which is still running its course, the tax and other incentives of each of the previous four phases 
are examined here. These five strategies or phases are described briefly below; details with 
respect to tax measures by sector are displayed in Table 1. 
 
During the 1950s, industrial development was just beginning in Taiwan. The basic 
strategy of the Taiwanese government was to follow an import substitution policy. The 
objective was to reduce Taiwan's international trade deficit. To compliment the import 
substitution policy the government also started to use tax measures to encourage investment in 
the sectors that would increase exports.    
                                                           
3 S.C. Tsiang, “Taiwan's Economic Miracle: Lessons in Economic Development”, edited by A.C. Harberger, 
Economic Policy and Economic Growth, (San Francisco: the Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1985). 4 
 
  The Statute for Encouraging Investment (SEI) was enacted in September 1960 and was 
in force for the following ten years (1961-70). Two sets of policy instruments were employed. 
First, tax policies were used to encourage savings, to stimulate investment and to promote 
exports. The major tax incentives such as the five-year income tax holidays were introduced. 
On the trade front, the government promoted trade liberalization for exports by establishing 
export processing zones. At the same time, imports were subject to high tariffs and under tight 
control in order to protect domestic industries. Second, the government administrative 
procedures were streamlined to facilitate the development of land for industrial purposes, 
resulting in a rapid economic expansion during this period. 
 
  When the first SEI expired, it was extended for another ten years (1971-80) and the 
scope of the tax incentives expanded to include both new businesses as well as the expansion of 
existing firms. The five-year tax holidays incentive was amended so that the enterprise could 
choose either to use accelerated depreciation or to have the tax holidays begin at the same time 
as the start of business production.
4  The non-tariff barriers on many commodities were 
substantially reduced in July 1972 but the tariff rates for some of these goods were increased. 
Intermediate inputs and machinery imported into the export-processing zone were all exempted 
from customs duties. 
  
  By the end of 1980, the government approved the third phase of the SEI for another ten 
years (1981-90). A greater emphasis was placed on the promotion of investment in high 
technology sectors, energy conservation, and pollution control equipment. A scheme was 
developed to provide business income tax credits for expenditures on research and 
development. 
 
  When the SEI expired at the end of 1990, an assessment by the government of the tax 
incentives concluded that they were causing an unfair distribution of the tax burden across 
industries and creating considerable administrative complexity. The incentives were distorting 
investment decisions due to their encouragement of specific industries and products. As a 
                                                           
4 During the first SEI, the tax incentive of the five-year tax holidays had begun from the start of the business of the 
qualified enterprises, which may or may not have begun production right away. 5 
result, the SEI was replaced by the Statute for Industrial Upgrading (SIU). This statute covered 
the period from January 1991 to June 1998. The new instruments were function-oriented rather 
than industry-oriented. They focused on the provision of investment tax credits for automated 
equipment in production, pollution-control equipment and related technologies, and 
expenditures on R&D, manpower training. It also included tax credits for overseas product 
advertising and investments in less-developed regions. This package of policies is not 
evaluated in this study. 
 
2.2  Key Macroeconomic Factors 
 
In addition to the tax incentives, there were major macroeconomic variables that had an 
important impact on the profitability of industrial investment. Three key factors are identified 
and their movements over the study period are discussed below.  
  
The Real Exchange Rate 
 
The real exchange rate is a key macroeconomic variable affecting the profitability of 
firms that engage in export activities. If the domestic currency is depreciated in real terms, 
exporters will receive more domestic currency each unit of foreign exchange earned, which 
gives them an incentive to produce more exportable goods. Over the past forty years, Taiwan 
has experienced a variety of exchange rate regimes. 
 
Prior to 1951, Taiwan maintained a single fixed exchange rate regime, accompanied by 
quantitative controls on the allocation of foreign exchange. In April 1951, two exchange rate 
systems were established, the Bank of Taiwan rate on currency and the Foreign Exchange 
Deposit Certificate rate. Transactions could be done at either of these rates or with a 
combination of the two. In October 1963, the foreign exchange control system was modified. 
The exchange rate with respect to the US dollar was set at NT$40. The Taiwan dollar was first 
re-valued and appreciated against the US dollar in February 1973. In July 1978, the exchange 
rate was no longer fixed to the US dollar and the Taiwan dollar was permitted to float within 
determined limits vis a vis the US dollar. Moreover, the businesses earning foreign exchange 
were no longer required to surrender their foreign exchange earnings to the Central Bank, but 6 
instead they had to open a foreign currency passbook account that they could use for business 
transactions requiring foreign exchange.   
 
The real exchange rate is expressed as the nominal exchange rate (defined as the 
number of Taiwan dollars per US dollar) multiplied by the ratio of the world price index to the 
domestic GDP deflator for Taiwan.
5 The world price index is approximated here by the 
weighted average of the dollar values of the wholesale price indices of Taiwan's major trading 
partners in 1985, including the U.S. (61.5 percent), Japan (28.4 percent), Germany (5.2 
percent), and Australia (4.9 percent).  
 
The real exchange rate reflects the international purchasing power of the Taiwan dollar.  
The lower the real exchange rate, the greater the appreciation of the Taiwan dollar with respect 
to the US dollar and vice versa. We find that the Taiwan dollar depreciated first in 1956, and 
later in 1959, 1965 and 1966 (see Column 4 of Table 2). Since then, and especially since 1985, 
it has generally appreciated. From 1985 to 1994, the Taiwan dollar appreciated by almost one-
third. By introducing changes in the real exchange rate into the cash flow model through their 
impact on the market exchange rate, one can assess the relative impacts on the financial returns 
of the exchange rate as compared to the tax incentives implemented during the past four 
decades. 
 
Since the basic data used in the cash flow model comes from the 1976 industrial census, 
the first year’s data for each investment project, which will be explained later, is expressed in 
1976 dollars (see Column 5 of Table 2). In order to be consistent with the prices of other 
variables used in the model, the nominal and real exchange rates used in the first year of the 
investment analysis for each subperiod are converted to NT$38 per US dollar and, for the 
remaining years, they are adjusted according to their actual movements during the subperiod 
(see Columns 6, 7, and 8).
6 
 
                                                           
5 See, e.g., A.C. Harberger, “Applications of Real Exchange Rate Analysis”, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 
7, Issue 2, (1989); J. Brun and R. Luders, (ed.), Macroeconomic Policy and the Exchange Rate, (San Francisco: 
International Center for Economic Growth, 1999). 
6 Four ten-year investment projects are considered for each of the five selected sectors. The periods of the 
investment are 1955-1964, 1964-1973, 1970-1979, and 1985-1994. As a result, NT$38 per US dollar is assumed 
in 1956, 1965, 1971, and 1986, respectively.  7 
The Real Wage 
 
The real industrial wage in Taiwan has risen considerably over the past forty years and 
this change has had a significant impact on the industrial development of Taiwan, especially in 
labor-intensive industries. While the growth of real wages is a reflection of the increase in 
overall labor productivity in the economy, for each firm hiring labor in an open labor market, 
the real wage increases are seen as an increase in the operating costs. To assess the relative 
importance of real wage rate changes, it is necessary to construct a time series for the real wage 
corresponding to the various development phases and then simulate the cash flow of each 
sector over each of four investment projects. 
 
We use the nominal average monthly earnings of employees in the manufacturing 
industry as a proxy for reflecting the year-to-year movements of nominal wages and salaries 
paid by the representative firms in the study. The real wage index is constructed by dividing 
nominal earnings by the consumer price index. These price indices are normalized to 100 in 
1976. Following a similar approach to the one used with the real exchange rate, the real wage 
index for the first year of each investment project is set equal to unity. 
 
The real wage index reflects the year-to-year fluctuation of labor costs in production. In 
Taiwan, the real industrial wage rose by approximately 25 percent over the eight-year period 
from 1956 to 1964, or at a compound growth rate of 2.8 percent per year. The growth in real 
wages from 1965 to 1973 was 69 percent for a compound annual growth rate of 6.8 percent.  
Between 1971 and 1979, there was a 74 percent increase in real wages, reflecting a compound 
growth rate of 7.2 percent. Again, between 1986 and 1994, real wages rose by almost 70 
percent, or at a compound growth rate of 6.9 percent. This rapid increase in real wages forced 
all exporting firms that wished to remain internationally competitive to increase their total 




From 1960 to 1986, the macroeconomic policy of Taiwan encouraged positive real 
interest rates on savings deposits.
7 This high real interest rate policy raised the rate of savings 
that was used to finance capital formation. Intermittently, the government also provided 
concessional financing to encourage investments in strategic industries. These enterprises, 
especially exporters, were eligible to receive preferential interest rates as low as half the 
general market rate.
8 These export-financing subsidies declined gradually until they were 
terminated in the early 1980s. The government then provided low interest rate loans to finance 
investments in new strategic industries, for the purchase of automated equipment, pollution-
prevention equipment, and the development of new products. In the following simulations, we 
evaluate the impact of this measure by setting the rate of subsidy on their financing equal to 
6.07 percentage points of the interest rate.
9 This corresponds to the largest rate of subsidy given 
during the entire period.  
 
III.  The Cash Flow Models 
 
To evaluate the relative impact of tax incentives and other economic variables on the 
rate of return on equity, we have constructed a detailed financial model of the cash flow profile 
of a typical firm from each sector and calculated the net present value (NPV) of an investment 
performance. The financial models of the investment and operation of these firms enable us to 
integrate a wide range of tax and tariff measures, as well as the movement of the real exchange 
rate, real wages, and real interest rates into the analysis of their impact on the financial 
profitability of the sector. 
 
                                                           
7 S.C. Tsiang, “Taiwan's Economic Miracle: Lessons in Economic Development”, edited by A.C. Harberger, 
Economic Policy and Economic Growth, (San Francisco: the Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1985). 
8 See The Central Bank of China, Economic Research Department, Financial Statistics Monthly, Taiwan District, 
the Republic of China, (February 1995). 
9 This figure is a half of the nominal interest rate which is calculated as follows: 
  Interest Rate = (1 + Real Rate + Risk Premium)(1 + Inflation Rate) – 1 
where the real interest rate with risk premium is assumed at 5 percent.  See Table 3.  9 
The modeling of net cash flows is one of the techniques commonly used for appraising 
capital investment decisions.
10 To evaluate the relative importance of the policy and macro-
economic variables, we set up a series of cash flow models for the investment and operation of 
selected industries in Taiwan. These models are for a typical firm representing the average 
value of investment, production, sales, inputs and other such variables that are part of the 
activities of each sector studied. They are set up for each of the four development stages or 
policy periods in which tax instruments and economic variables will be examined.  
 
The model estimates the cash flow profile of an investment project, which identifies all 
the receipts and expenditures that are expected to occur during the lifetime of the project. These 
receipts and expenditures are converted to annual cash inflows and outflows. From the point of 
view of the owners of the enterprise, the annual nominal net cash flow -- net of corporate and 
other taxes -- in year t, (CFnt) can be expressed as follows: 
 
CFnt = ∑iEntPfit Qit - ∑mEntPfmt (1+tmt )Qmt - ∑nPdnt (1+tnt )Qnt  
              + ∑mEntPfmkQmk + ∑nPdnkQnk + Lt - DSt - Tt - CBt    (1)   
 
Where Ent is the market exchange rate; Pfit is the world price of the ith product in year t; Qit is 
the quantity of the ith product produced and sold; Pfmt is the world price of the mth tradable 
business input including the capital and operating items; Qmt is the quantity of the 
corresponding mth tradable business input purchased; Pdnt is the domestic price of the nth 
nontradable business input; Qnt is the quantity of the corresponding nth nontradable business 
input purchased. As equation (1) refers to a cash flow statement, the values of the annual sales 
are adjusted for changes in accounts receivable and the values of annual purchases are adjusted 
for the changes in accounts payable. Pfmk and Qmk are the world price and quantity of the kth 
tradable liquidated asset while Pdnk and Qnk are the domestic price and quantity of the kth 
nontradable liquidated asset. They are treated as a non-taxed cash inflow in the last year of the 
project. Their values are calculated by depreciating the fixed assets by the appropriate rate of 
economic depreciation plus the value of working capital at that point in time. Lt is the loans 
received by the firm; and DSt represents the annual debt service payment; Tt is the corporate 
                                                           
10 See, e.g., W.F. Sharpe, Investments, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, INC., 1981); P. Belli, J.R. 
Anderson, H.N. Barnum, J.A. Dixon, and J.P. Tan, Economic Analysis of Investment Operations – Analytical 
Tools and Practical Applications, (Washington, DC: the World Bank, 2001). 10 
income taxes and other capital taxes; CBt is the change in the desired stock cash balances held 
to facilitate business transactions. 
 
  The market exchange rate (Ent) is affected by the real exchange rate (Ert) and the 
relative domestic to foreign price index. They can be expressed at any point in time (t) as: 
 
  Ent = Ert · (Idt/Ift)           ( 2 )  
 
where Idt and Ift are the domestic and foreign price indices in time t, which are the cumulative 
change in the price level from the reference year to t. The real exchange rate will move through 
time by the forces of the country’s demand and supply of foreign exchange. As mentioned in 
the previous section, the real exchange rate in the reference year is assumed to be NT$38 per 
U.S. dollar for each policy period. Over time if the domestic inflation differs from that of the 
trading partners, the change in the relative domestic and foreign price index must result in an 
equal change in the market exchange rate.  
  
Any tax incentives related to the income or other capital taxes will affect the amount of 
taxes payable by the firm, Tt, as shown in equation (1).
11 Moreover, there are also important tax 
implications associated with indirect tax policies. The price of the ith product, Pfit, if tradable, 
will be the world fob price of the ith product times the market exchange rate. The output tariffs 
have no impact on export sales and the value of the sales received by the exporters, but they 
could provide a substantial level of protection to producers selling products domestically, if 
entry into the domestic market by exporting firms is restricted. The price of a unit of the 
product, when sold domestically, would increase by the force of the respective tariff rate.
12 As 
regard the business inputs, they can be either tradable or nontradable and their prices are 
                                                           
11 Each of the income tax incentives are applied in the spreadsheets estimating the net cashflows exactly as 
specified by the legislation authorizing each of the tax incentives. 
12 While the output tariffs do not have an impact on export-oriented enterprises, they could provide a substantial 
level of protection to producers selling products domestically. The gross cash inflow from the sale of a unit of the 
product in the domestic market will increase by the force of the tariff. For firms supplying the protected domestic 
market, we expect to find that the PV of the net of tax income stream would be greater than the initial value of the 
investment, if these firms are as productive as the exporting enterprises. The difference between the NPV of the 
net income stream of a domestic supplier and that of an exporter in the same sector reflects the potential financial 
rents a firm can earn, or waste, if the domestic prices are increased by the full amount of the tariffs.  11 
determined by the world cif price plus tariffs if imported and the domestic price if purchased 
locally.  
 
The nominal net cash flows derived from equation (1) are deflated to derive the real net 
cash flow (CFrt). The real net cash flows are then discounted by a discount rate (ρ) in order to 
derive the NPV of the cash flows for the investment evaluated as of year j: 
 
NPVj = ∑t [(CFrt)/(1 + ρ)
t-j]          ( 3 )  
 
Since Taiwan is a small open economy, its exports can be sold only at prevailing 
international prices. Imposition of an output tariff does not have an impact on the cash flow or 
the rate of return of export-oriented firms. A tariff on importable inputs, however, will raise the 
financial cost of these inputs by the amount of import duties, resulting in a lower NPV or a 
lower rate of return on equity.  
 
Because of the numerous tax incentives, special attention is paid to the calculation of 
the business income tax and other taxes. For example, the provisions of depreciation expense, 
interest subsidies, and other tax incentive measures provided by the government influence the 
magnitude of business income taxes. Each of these tax provisions is modeled in detail and 
applied to the relevant cash flow variables according to the tax laws in Taiwan at the time. 
 
To develop a base case for each set of industrial investments in each policy period, we 
calibrate the level of output in the cash flow model so that with all of components of the 
corresponding policy packages in place, a net of tax real rate of return to equity of 12 percent is 
earned by the investment in export-oriented firms or the exporting branch of the sector. 
Because the real discount rate used to evaluate the net cash flow profiles is also 12 percent, the 
present value (PV) of the cash flow generated by the investment will be exactly equal to the PV 
of the initial investment. This implies that on the margin only a competitive rate of return on 
equity is earned in the exporting activity. 
 
By calibrating the cash flow model in this way for each policy period, we are being 
consistent with the actual historical situation in Taiwan. For most of this forty-year period, all 12 
of these sectors were able to compete successfully in the export markets, while at the same time 
producing for the protected domestic market. During the last 15 years, the pressure put on 
industries by the growth of real wages and the appreciation of the real exchange rate has forced 
some sectors to retrench or shift product lines in order to obtain the productivity levels needed 
to earn competitive rates of return. 
 
Once the cash flow model for the typical exporting firm in a sector is calibrated so that 
the PV of the future net of tax income stream equals the PV of the initial investment, we can 
measure the financial impact on the value of the firm arising from each of tax incentives and 
the movement in real wage rates and the real exchange rate. This is done by moving the value 
of each of these variables (one at a time) to their pre-incentive values and then evaluating the 
PV of the net of tax cash flows now provided by the same investments in the adjusted policy 
environment. The difference between the PV of the initial value of the investment and the PV 
of this new net cash flow measures the positive or negative impact of the policy variable on the 
value of the firm. 
 
IV. Empirical  Results 
 
In this section, the data employed for analysis are described and the empirical findings 
are also presented. 
 
4.1 The  Data 
  
The basic investment data used in this paper for each sector came from the 1976 Census 
of Manufacturing in Taiwan. Five cases were studied; they include cotton textile, knitted 
apparel, plywood, television, and electronics industries. These industries were chosen because 
they accounted for a high percentage of total exports from Taiwan and had their most rapid 
growth during the import substitution and export promotion periods.
13 Except for plywood, 
these sectors continued to be competitive throughout the study period. The plywood sector 
ceased to be competitive after 1980. 
                                                           
13 For example, the minimum criteria for a group to be considered was that it should account for at least 3 percent 
of total exports in any period, and should have relatively rapid growth in some periods. 13 
 
For each representative firm, the analysis of the investment was carried out for a period 
of 10 years. Total investment was classified into production machinery and equipment, 
buildings and infrastructure, and land; these components were estimated on the basis of the 
average value for the firms in the sector in 1976.
14 For each new investment, land is assumed to 
be acquired in year 0, while expenditures on buildings and machinery were made in years 1 and 
2. Because of the nature of Taiwan’s economy, all production machinery and equipment is 
assumed to be imported from abroad. The economic lives of the fixed assets were based on the 
data published by the government.
15 This information of economic depreciation rates was used 
to estimate the residual value of the assets at the end of each analysis period. 
 
The production costs of tradable and nontradable inputs for each typical firm were also 
obtained from the Manufacturing Census Data. Tradable inputs include material costs and fuel 
consumption, while nontradable inputs consist of electric power, water, and labor. The labor 
costs, which were broken down into costs for workers and supervisors/technicians, were also 
obtained from the same data sources. Overhead costs were also estimated for each 
representative firm. 
 
For each of the periods covered by the study we maintain the same proportional mix of 
assets by value for a sector as existed in 1976. However, their productivity in terms of the 
output the firm produces is allowed to change. This simplifying assumption allows us to focus 
on the impact of the tax incentives on asset values.  
 
The production of each firm begins in the third year of its life at 85 percent of the full 
capacity; from year 4 on, the firm was considered to be operating at full production capacity. 
Inventories were valued on a first-in-first-out basis. Being part of the working capital, accounts 
receivable were assumed to represent 15 percent of the gross sales, and accounts payable to be 
12.5 percent of the gross input purchases. To facilitate transactions, cash balances were 
                                                           
14 Executive Yuan, 1976 Industrial and Commercial Census of Taiwan-Fukien District of the Republic of China, 
Volume III, Book I, Taiwan District Manufacturing, published by the Committee on Industrial and Commercial 
Census of Taiwan-Fukien District of the Republic of China.  
15 See a series of announcements entitled The Durability of Fixed Assets by the Executive Yuan, Republic of 
China (various years). 14 
assumed to be 10 percent of the gross sales. By the end of the operating period, the residual 
values include both the value of land and any undepreciated assets. 
 
The analysis of these cases was conducted in constant prices, measured in terms of the 
1976 price level. However, to model the impact of the tax system, we needed first to model the 
nominal cash flows in exactly the way that the taxes were applied according to the legislation. 
The resulting nominal streams of cash flows are then deflated in order to derive their real 
values. To simplify the analysis, the annual inflation over the life of the project was assumed at 
6.8 percent in Taiwan and 6.1 percent abroad.
16 These rates correspond to the average rate of 
domestic and world inflation, respectively, from 1960 to 1980. The world price of exported 
products and tradable inputs was assumed to increase at the foreign inflation rate, while the 
prices of both domestic products and nontradable inputs grew at the domestic inflation rate. 
The market exchange rate was adjusted to reflect the actual movements of the real exchange 
rate during each of the subperiods under examination.   
 
The initial debt/equity ratio for each investment was assumed to be 30/70. The nominal 
market rate of interest was measured in such a way to compensate for the real time value of 
money, the possibility of the borrower’s defaulting on the loan, and the expected loss of 
purchasing power attributable to inflation. For the purpose of this analysis, the real interest rate 
(including any risk premium) was assumed to be 5 percent. Given the inflation rate, the 
nominal interest rate was estimated to be 12.14 percent. The debt is assumed to be paid off in 
five years. This implies that the average ratio of debt/equity over the life of the project is 
somewhat less than 30/70.   
 
Details of these project parameters are summarized in Table 3. 
 
4.2  The Simulation Results 
 
The simulations were carried out for export-oriented firms of the five selective sectors, 
for all four policy periods. As mentioned earlier, the basic investment data used were obtained 
                                                           
16 The inflation rates were calculated on the basis of the average annual consumer price index in Taiwan and a 
trade-weighted world price index for foreign inflation over the period from 1960 to 1980. 15 
from the 1976 Census Manufacturing in Taiwan and the values of all project variables are 
expressed in 1976 prices. To evaluate the effect of fiscal incentives and macroeconomic 
variables on industrialization in each of the four policy periods, the magnitudes of the 10-year 
investment project in each sector are assumed unchanged between the four policy periods, but 
the values of tax policy, real foreign exchange and real wage all reflect the situation in the 
respective policy periods studied. For example, the price deflators and tax policy measures in 
different policy period are summarized in Table 1 while the movement of the real exchange 
rate is shown in Table 2.    
 
The simulation results are presented in Table 4 by sector and by policy period. The 
initial value of the assets held by a typical export-oriented firm can be expressed as the PV of 
the fixed capital investment plus inventories and other working capital. Over the life of the 
project, the NPV of the assets may be increased or decreased, depending upon their financial 
performance. In the base case for each panel project, we included in the cash flow model all the 
effects of the tax incentives, financial assistance received from the government, as well as 
changes in the real exchange rate and real wages over the life of the project. In each case, the 
model was calibrated with the 12 percent real rate of return on equity to generate a NPV of 
zero, thus leaving the initial asset values unchanged. The impact of each of the policy measures 
as well as the effect of the changes in the macroeconomic variables were then estimated by 
removing in sequence from the model, the effects of financing subsidies, tax incentives, 
changes in the real wage, and changes in the real exchange rate and then re-simulating it. The 
contribution of each incentive or above variable to the asset value was then calculated as the 
change in the NPV from the prior case (starting with the base case) to the next case, in which 
the effect of one more variable had been removed. The relative sizes of the changes in NPV 
caused by the removal of each of the policy or economic variables gave us an indication of the 
relative impact of the respective variable on the investment in that industry. 
 
Real Exchange Rate 
 
When policies for both import-substitution and export promotion (1955-64) were 
simultaneously pursued, the incremental NPVs are presented for export-oriented firms in the 
second column of Table 4. One can see the significant contribution of the devaluation of the 16 
Taiwan dollar to the return on investment in this period. Table 2 shows that the real exchange 
rate was increased from NT$28.41/US$ in 1955 to NT$53.62/US$ in 1959 and then it fell to 
NT$45.58/US$ in 1964 as a result of the liberalization of the foreign exchange market.
17 The 
60 percent depreciation of the Taiwan dollar over this period caused an increase in the price 
level of tradable goods relative to nontradable ones, leading to a proportional increase in the 
gross annual cash inflow and an increase in the supply of exports. This benefit was offset to 
some extent by the increase in the cost of tradable inputs used in production. This phenomenon 
affected positively the value of the cotton textile firm by about 26 percent of the initial value of 
the assets. The effect of the increase in the real exchange rate was especially profound in the 
knitted apparel, television, and electronics sectors. 
 
After 1960, the Taiwan dollar started to appreciate slowly in real terms, making it more 
difficult for industries to compete in international markets, even though the impact was offset 
to some extent by the lower cost of tradable inputs. The third column of Table 4 clearly shows 
that the lower real exchange rate during the first SEI phase (1964-73) had a considerable 
adverse effect on the profitability of export-oriented firms in all sectors. The lower real 
exchange rate, for example, reduced the value of investment in the knitted apparel industry by 
almost 79 percent and by an even greater impact of 113 percent in the television sector. 
 
As a result of the rapid growth of export earnings and trade surpluses enjoyed by 
Taiwan, the Taiwanese currency appreciated much faster, especially during the third stage of 
the SEI (1985-94) in which the real exchange rate declined by more than 25 percent.
18 The 
appreciation of the Taiwan dollar had an enormous negative impact on the financial 
performance of all firms, by ranging from more than 84 percent of the initial investment in 
cotton textile to 493 percent in the television sector. 
 
                                                           
17 As a result of the market-based exchange rate policy, the Taiwan dollar depreciated in 1959. Details can be 
found in S.C. Tsiang, “Taiwan's Economic Miracle: Lessons in Economic Development”, edited by A.C. 
Harberger, Economic Policy and Economic Growth, (San Francisco: the Institute for Contemporary Studies, 
1985). 
18 The experience and economic policies of Taiwan during this period have been similar to those of Japan where 
the strong productivity changes in the traded sectors of the economy have not been realized to the same degree in 
the non-traded sectors. As a consequence the real exchange rate has declined. 17 
Real Wage Rate 
 
The increase in the real wage rates also had a negative effect on the firms. During the 
initial period of import substitution and export promotion, the real wage increased by almost 25 
percent over the life period, but the bulk of the increase occurred during the last four years of 
the period. As a result, the impact of the real wage increase on profitability did not offset a 
significant proportion of the financial benefits given by the change in the real exchange rate.   
 
Real wages in Taiwan have increased approximately 7 percent per annum since 1967. 
This had substantial negative effect on the financial performance of the businesses as shown in 
the fourth row of each panel project in Table 4. The effect, however, was not as severe as that 
of the appreciation of the real exchange rate. Taking the third SEI phase as an example, the 
impact of the real wage ranged from 10 to 25 percent of the impact of the movement of the real 
exchange rate.




The impact of concessional financing, shown in Table 4 row 5 of each panel, was 
positive, but its effect was equal to less than 3 percent of the value of the investments in all 
sectors and in all study periods. In relative terms, the interest rate subsidy had only a marginal 
impact on the return on investment. In Taiwan, typically the manufacturing firms are not highly 
leveraged, and the benefit from reduced interest payments was offset to some extent by the 




                                                           
19 The change in total factor productivity in the economy, change in the real wage rate, and the change in the real 
exchange rate are all related macro-economic variables. However, in terms of any single industry or firm the 
values of these variables need not be related. If the change in total factor productivity of any firm is not sufficient 
to offset the change in the real wage and the change in the real exchange rate that are economy wide phenomena, 
then it will go out of business. 
20 Other researchers have found a similar conclusion.  See, e.g., Y.H. Yang, "Government Policy and Strategic 
Industries: The Case of Taiwan", edited by T. Ito and A.O. Krueger, Trade and Protectionism: NBER-East Asia 
Seminar on Economics, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). 18 
Tax Incentives 
 
Simulating the effect of each tax incentive measure provided to businesses offers 
valuable insights. The model was simulated in such way that when a policy or an amendment 
to the previous policy was introduced in the current period it can be evaluated as an 
incremental policy change in the current period. However, the results shown in Table 4 present 
the cumulative impact of the policy changes that were implemented over the successive policy 
period of the study.  
 
The five-year tax holiday introduced in the first stage of the SEI appeared to have had a 
modest effect on firms (Table 4 row 7) if they were selling only to the international markets. 
This is due to the fact that a business could only take advantage of the business income tax 
exemption for a period of five years from the date of the inception of business. The newly 
established exporting enterprises did not make full use of the holiday since they could not 
generate enough profit or positive taxable income in the early years of the business.
21   
 
During the second stage of the SEI, the modified five-year income tax holiday, along 
with the amended accelerated depreciation provision, provided firms with an additional 
positive incentive. As a result, the seventh row of each panel project in Table 4 shows the 
impact of the tax holiday as well as the amended tax holiday and accelerated depreciation 
provisions on the initial asset value of investments. For export-oriented firms, the present value 
of the impact by the modified tax holiday ranged from 4.2 percent of the initial investment in 
the television sector to 6.2 percent in the electronics sector.        
 
The provision for the deduction of up to 2 percent of the annual export earnings from 
the taxable income (Table 4 row 8) provided an additional, though modest, incentive for export 
promotion. The impact attributable to a lower deed tax (Table 4 row 9) was marginal, because 
it was a one-time benefit and the magnitude of the incentive was also small. The exemption of 
import duty on imported machinery and equipment (Table 4 row 10) provided a positive impact 
on all firms. Such benefits increased in the second stage of the SEI because the import duty 
                                                           
21 The tax holidays could have a much bigger effect on the financial profitability of firms selling primarily to the 
domestic markets because the high tariff barriers raised the domestic prices of the products, and hence the 
profitability of these activities. 19 
rates were raised as a result of the second phase of import substitution.
22 However, the benefits 
were reduced in the third stage of the SEI because of lower import duty rates on machinery and 
equipment. 
 
During the period of import substitution and export promotion, two important indirect 
tax measures were introduced. The first measure was an increase in import duties for 
manufactured products that provided protection to producers selling to the domestic market. 
The second measure was the duty rebate on imported inputs used in making exported goods 
that were designed to promote exports.
23 Its impact was determined by the size of the import 
content of business inputs and the rate of tariffs imposed on these inputs.
24 The impact was 
enormous, for example, for the knitted apparel sector (Table 4 row 11). The rebate raised the 
initial asset value by more than 131 percent. Without the duty rebate scheme, it would have 
been unprofitable to export. Impacts of a similar magnitude are observed for the plywood and 
television export industries. In the case of cotton textile, the impact was not as significant as 
other sectors because the rates of duty on imported inputs were relatively low. It is clear that if 
the duty rebate system had not been implemented, the export promotion program would have 
been much less effective.  
 
In this analysis we assume that the duty rebate or duty drawback scheme worked 
effectively and efficiently. This is, however, almost never the case. Duty drawback systems are 
usually cumbersome, complex, and fraught with delay.
25 To the degree that this program 
worked inefficiently, the results presented here would overstate the degree that these firms 
benefited from this program. We find that in later years the government introduced a duty 
                                                           
22 The objective was to replace imports with domestically produced semi-processed materials and mechanical 
equipment. See, e.g., K.T. Li, The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan’s development Success, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989). 
23 No rebate is received on domestically purchased inputs whose price would be raised as a consequence of a 
tariff. 
24 For the country as a whole, the amount of custom duty rebates associated with exports increased from NT$17 
million in 1955 to more than NT$23.6 billion in 1980. In percentage terms, it rose from 2.3 percent of total 
customs duties in 1955 to more than 86.1 percent in 1972, and then gradually declined to 41.5 percent in 1980.  
See the Ministry of Finance, Department of Statistics, Yearbook of Financial Statistics of the Republic of China, 
1999, (June 2000). 
25 See, e.g., G.P. Jenkins and C.Y Kuo, “Promoting Export-Oriented Foreign Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries: Tax and Customs Issues”, Harvard Institute for International Development CAER II Discussion Paper, 
No. 65, (May 2000). 20 
exemption system to achieve the objectives of the duty rebate system, with more efficient and 
less administrative burden.  
 
Simulations were also carried out for other policy periods. For export-oriented firms in 
the first stage of the SEI, an increase in the tariff rates on the materials used in the cotton textile 
sector made the duty exemption more valuable by 3.5 percent to a total of 7.6 percent (see 
Table 4 row 11). In contrast, the 20 percent, 40 percent and 11 percent reduction of tariff rates 
on materials used in the knitted apparel, television and electronics sector, lowered the value of 
the duty exemption by the respective sector.
26  
 
During this period, export processing zones were first established in Kaohsiung in 
December 1966 and subsequently they were expanded to Nantze in January 1969 and Taichung 
in August 1969. Imports into the zones were duty-free and the products were shipped abroad 
directly. Materials and other tradable inputs used in the processing zone were mostly imported 
because they could enter duty free. The trade administration in these zones also operated 
relatively efficiently. Most of the firms in these zones were engaged in the electronics, cotton 
textile and knitted apparel, and plastic products sector. On the other front, the customs bonded 
factories were introduced in 1968 to diminish the congestion of export activities around the 
export processing zones and also offer increased flexibility and lower costs of production for 
firms that needed to be close to resources used in production. Investment, employment, and 
annual exports from these zones and factories all expanded rapidly and contributed to the 
overall expansion of the Taiwanese economy, especially during the 1970s. 
 
An analysis of the impact of the tax measures was also carried out for the second and 
third stage of the SEI. Trade liberalization was one of the main policy measures of the third 
SEI.  The first major cut in duty rates took place in 1984. Looking at the average effective tariff 
rate for the nation as a whole, it was substantially reduced to 26.5 percent in 1985, 9.6 percent 
in 1990, 8.9 percent in 1993, and 4.5 percent in 1995.
27 Although the cut in import duties on 
finished products had no impact on export-oriented enterprises, the reduction of tariff rates on 
tradable inputs lowered the benefits of the duty drawback and tax exemption provisions. These 
                                                           
26 For example, the 20 percent figure represents a reduction of duty rates from 50 percent to 40 percent in the 
knitted apparel sector.   See Table 1. 
27 Ministry of Finance, Republic of China, (January 1996). 21 
effects are seen in the sectors of knitted apparel, plywood, television, and electronics, as shown 
in the last column of Table 4. In the case of cotton textile, the benefit increased because of 
higher duty rates levied on materials that were used in the sector.  
 
In summary, the above simulation results demonstrate that fiscal measures played an 
important role in Taiwan’s industrial policies. However, the findings concerning the relative 
impacts of the different policy instruments are surprising. The most effective policy instrument 
was import tariff rebates used in the early stages of export promotion, not the incentive policies 
related to income taxes. The tax holiday and accelerated depreciation provision provided a 
small incentive to export-oriented firms. The interest subsidy might have been helpful as well, 
but its effect was not significant as compared to those of the trade policies, changes in the real 
wage or in the real exchange rate. 
 
A sound macroeconomic policy was one of the most crucial factors that initially 
facilitated Taiwan’s industrialization process. The unification of the exchange rate and the 
depreciation of the Taiwan dollar in the late 1950s were the most important instruments in 
making the export lead industrialization policies profitable for businesses in the initial stage. 
The market-determined interest rate policy in early 1960s raised the rate of savings that was 
used to finance capital investment. The stability of the government policies had contributed a 
great deal to the initial development of the Taiwanese economy. That being said, the policies 
that caused the real exchange rate to appreciate over time became one of the most important 
obstacles faced by businesses in expanding their growth in exports. To a lesser extent, the 
general increase in real wages in the economy also put pressure on individual exporters in their 
effort to remain competitive in international markets. 
 
V.  Productivity Increases to Offset the Increase in Real Wages and the Appreciation 
of the Currency  
 
During the past thirty years, the appreciation of the real exchange rate and the rise in 
real wages were a result of a rapid rate of productivity increase in the economy. At the same 
time, both variables put considerable pressures on exporting businesses overall to remain 22 
competitive in their international markets. Despite these obstacles, Taiwan’s economy has 
continued to grow rapidly. 
 
In this section, we calculate the minimum percentage productivity increase (or total cost 
reduction) required to maintain the same net of tax real rate of return of 12 percent between the 
periods covered by this study. Except for plywood, all of the other sectors have survived in 
some form to 1995 in Taiwan.
28 In order for the survivors to exist they must be earning at least 
a competitive rate of return. In other words, we are estimating the minimum rate of 
productivity change that must have been experienced in the sectors that survived all of these 




To calculate this percentage productivity increase, we first calibrated the cash flow 
model in a way similar to the calibrations done for the firms in the previous section. But this 
time we remove the movements of both the real exchange rate and the real wage. In order to 
generate the same PV of the cash flow as in the initial calibrated model, we multiplied the 
annual output and associated intermediate inputs by an adjustment factor. These adjustment 
factors are shown in the second column of Table 5. The third step was to calculate the inverse 
of the adjustment factor and then to calculate the difference between this value and unity. This 
difference measures the increase in total factor productivity that must have occurred to offset 
the increase in real wages and real exchange rate during each specific policy period. To the 
degree that real world prices of these goods denominated in foreign currency fell during the 
period, this is a minimum estimate of the increase in productivity required to offset the 
movement of real wages and the real exchange rate. The results expressed as an annual rate are 
presented in the third column of Table 5. 
                                                           
28 For plywood, its demise is traced to the 1980s when many countries banned the sale of logs for export. 
29 Total factor productivity is normally estimated as the difference between the growth in real output and the 
growth of the quantities of factor inputs employed. 23 
 
During the period of import substitution and export promotion, the movements of the 
real exchange rate and of the real wage made a positive contribution to the present value of the 
net of tax cash flows of the affected industries. No productivity increase was thus necessary to 
compensate for the changes in these parameter values since the positive effect of the 
devaluation of the real exchange rate outweighed the negative effect of the rising real wage. 
 
From Table 5 we see that during the first SEI period, if there had been no change in real 
wages or the real exchange rate the representative firms in the cotton textile industry would 
have needed to produce only 80 percent of the output they actually did produce in order to earn 
a 12 percent rate of return. This implies that in the presence of the changes in the real wage and 
in the real exchange rate, the firms must have had to increase their output by 2.3 percent a year 
in order to earn the target 12 percent real rate of return on equity. 
 
As the economy moved from the 1960s into the 1970s the pressure put on the exporting 
sectors by the movements of the real wage and the real exchange rate rose steadily. In the 
1980s, the pace accelerated dramatically. During the late 1980s, increase of productivity of 
capital and labor in the knitted apparel, television and electronics sectors would have had to be 
10.8 percent, 13.1 percent and 7.3 percent annually, respectively, in order to maintain the same 
rate of return on investment. This improvement in the operational efficiency of the firms over 
such a long period of time is the key to understanding why Taiwan was able to achieve such a 
rapid rate of economic growth over this forty year period. 
 
VI. Concluding  Remarks 
 
In this paper, a model has been developed to assess the impacts of the tax incentives 
and other economic variables on the returns to investment in selected sectors from 1955 to the 
mid-1990s in Taiwan. The analysis was carried out in an integrated manner in which the 
movements of all variables were allowed to interact with each other. 24 
 
The objective of this analysis was to determine the relative importance of the various 
tax, trade, and financial policies for the profitability of export-oriented firms producing goods 
in the international markets. It is a popular belief that the most important fiscal incentives are 
income tax provisions such as tax holidays, investment tax credits, export sales based income 
tax credits, and accelerated depreciation. Our results, however, show that the duty drawback 
and duty exemption programs are by far the most important policy measures for exporting 
firms. Another popular incentive policy for export promotion is to subsidize the interest rate on 
export investment finance. Our results indicate that its actual impact on the overall rate of 
return on the project is marginal. 
 
The devaluation of the Taiwan dollar in late 1950s was a critical turning point in 
Taiwan’s industrial development strategy. This policy enhanced the profitability of investment 
in the export sector. However, the steady appreciation of the Taiwan dollar over the next three 
decades imposed a negative impact on the return to investments in the export sectors. The 
market-oriented interest rate policy had resulted in higher interest rates to savings that was able 
to finance capital investment needed for the economic development. A rapid rate of total 
productivity growth prevailed in order to maintain the existing level of profitability in these 
export-oriented industries. This process accelerated over the period of 1980s. The results of this 
analysis points to the favourable trade policies, and the rapid cutting of production costs by 
entrepreneurs that enabled exporting industries to expand while labor was enjoying a rapid 
increase in real wages. These factors were much more important than the income tax incentives 
or financial subsidy policies in Taiwan’s achievement of a rapid pace of industrialization 
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Price Deflator (1976=1.0)  0.264  0.443  0.564  1.805 
Tax Holiday  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Property Taxes (%) 
  Land Value Tax
2 
  Deed Tax
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1 Reference year refers to the year the tax system applied.  
    
 2 As % of land value. 
   
   3 As % of building and infrastructure. 
     
4 The method of calculating depreciation is fixed percentage of diminishing book value method. 
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Table 2 
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Real Exchange Rate Index  
Using  
Different Reference Years* 
  (A)          (B)            (C)            (D) 
   (5)           (6)            (7)             (8) 
1955  15.55 25.68 46.92  28.41  25.08       
1956  24.78 27.94 48.53  43.04  38.00       
1957  24.78 30.37 49.76  40.60  35.85       
1958  24.78 31.87 50.34  39.14  34.56       
1959  36.38 34.11 50.27  53.62  47.34       
1960  36.38 38.70 50.70  52.40  46.26       
1961  40.00 40.58 50.58  49.86  44.02       
1962  40.00 41.43 50.68  48.93  43.20       
1963  40.00 42.84 50.60  47.25  41.72       
1964  40.00 44.61 50.83  45.58  40.24  37.00    
1965  40.00 44.35 51.90  46.81    38.00    
1966  40.00 45.55 53.59  47.06    38.20    
1967  40.00 47.62 53.80  45.19    36.68    
1968  40.00 50.82 55.76  43.89    35.63    
1969  40.00 54.03 57.09  42.27    34.31    
1970  40.00 55.91 59.24  42.38    34.40  37.74  
1971  40.00 57.58 61.43  42.67    34.64  38.00  
1972  40.00 60.92 64.61  42.42    34.44  37.78  
1973  38.25 70.08 73.98  40.38    32.78  35.96  
1974  38.00 92.77 87.73  35.93     32.00  
1975  38.00 94.70 95.60  38.36     34.16  
1976 38.00  100.00 100.00  38.00      33.84   
1977 38.00  106.31 195.86  37.84      33.70   
1978 36.95  111.94 114.79  37.89      33.74   
1979 36.00  124.79 129.21  37.26      33.18   
1980 36.00  145.01 147.35  36.58         
1981 36.79  162.50 159.45  36.10         
1982 39.12  168.08 161.82  37.66         
1983 40.06  171.31 163.07  38.13         
1984 39.62  172.83 166.58  38.19         
1985 39.86  173.85 164.28  37.67        42.09 
1986 37.85  179.73 161.48  34.01        38.00 
1987 28.50  180.62 167.54  26.44        29.54 
1988 28.12  182.56 175.93  27.10        30.28 
1989 26.12  188.23 184.11  25.55        28.55 
1990 27.99  195.39 191.80  27.48        30.70 
1991 25.75  208.68 203.50  25.11        28.06 
1992 25.40  222.87 215.91  24.61        27.50 
1993 26.62  238.02 229.08  25.62        28.63 
1994 26.62  254.21 243.06  25.45        28.44 
Sources: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book, (1995). 
Notes: *The real exchange rate index for each year within a sub-period is calculated by multiplying the 
real exchange rate for that year under Column (4) by the ratio of $38.00 to the real exchange 
rate for the first year of that investment project.  
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Table 3 
Basic investment Project Parameters for Representative Firms 






Plywood Television  Electronics 
Investment cost 
  Production Machinery (US$000): 
       Year 1 
       Year 2 
  Buildings & Infrastructure(NT$000): 
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  Land (NT$000): 














































Economic Service Life (years) 
  Machinery & Equipment 
















Input Cost Per Unit of Output 
  Tradable Inputs: 
        Imported Inputs (US$) 
        Domestic Inputs (NT$) 
  Non-tradable Inputs (NT$) 































Labor Cost Per Month 
  Workers (NT$) 
















Overhead Costs per Year (NT$000)  4,100  2,600  6,600  6,400  10,800 
Financing 
  Debt/Equity Ratio 
  Suppliers’ Credit 
        Real Interest Rate Inclusive of  
              Risk Premium (%) 



































Contribution of Various Factors to the Initial Asset of Export-Oriented Firms 
  
 



















1.  Initial Asset Value (thousands of NT dollars) 
2.  The Percentage Impact Attributed to (%): 
3.  - Real Exchange Rate 
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6.  - Tax Incentives 
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8.     - Taxable Income Reduced by 2 percent of Export Sales 
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 Table 5 
Required Increase in Annual Productivity  
by Sector to Maintain Same Rate of Return  
(percentage) 
 







Increase in Total 
Factor Productivity  
First-Stage SEI (1964-73) 
  Cotton Textile 
  Knitted Apparel 
  Television 











Second-Stage SEI (1970-79) 
  Cotton Textile 
  Knitted Apparel 
  Television 











Third-Stage SEI (1985-94) 
  Cotton Textile 
  Knitted Apparel 
  Television 
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